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Abstract
Corruption in general and doping in particular are ubiquitous in both ama-
teur and professional sports and have taken the character of a systemic threat. In
creating unfair advantages, doping distorts the level playing field in sporting com-
petition. With higher stakes involved, such distortions create negative externalities
not only on the individual level (e.g. lasting health damages) but also frictions on
the aggregate level (e.g. loss of media interest) and erode the principle of sports.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive literature overview of the individual
drivers to dope, the concomitant detrimental effects and respective countermea-
sures. In explaining the athletes motivation to use performance enhancing drugs,
we enrich the discussion by adapting insights from behavioral economics. These
insights help to understand such an athletes decision beyond a clear-cut rationale
but rather as a product of the interaction with the underlying environment. We
stress that in order to ensure clean sports and fair competition, more sophisticated
measurement methods have to be evolved and the respective data made publicly
available in order to facilitate more extensive studies in the future. So far, the lack
of data is alarming, especially in the area of elite sports where the stakes are high
and doping has a substantial influence.
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1 Introduction
“SPORT BRINGS PEOPLE TOGETHER: IT IS NOT ONLY ABOUT WIN-
NING AND LOSING, BUT ALSO ABOUT A COMMON INTEREST OR A
COMMON LOVE OF SPORT. SPORT IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE AREA. IT
IS NOT ONLY FOR PROFESSIONALS, SPORT IS FOR EVERYBODY. IT
GIVES EVERYBODY FROM DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS, GENERATIONS
AND ABILITIES A REAL SENSE OF BELONGING AND A PERSONAL FUL-
FILLMENT.”
12th Anti-Corruption Conference, Guatemala, 2006
Corruption is not a new phenomenon, but rather a persistent feature of human soci-
eties. In one form or another, corruption has always existed. Over the last years, politics
increasingly tried to implement sophisticated regulations and constitutional reforms to
defend their political institutions and systems against corruption, being fully aware of
the possible long-lasting and detrimental effects corruption might impose on economy
and society. Its credit belongs to the scholars and the media, who unflinchingly put
this topic into the limelight of the peoples attention. There is a remarkably increased
awareness that fighting corruption is fundamental to mitigating the wide-ranging set of
accompanied negative externalities corruption. Among these, research points at an in-
crease of income disparities and poverty, discontinuous economic development, squeeze
out of foreign direct investments, emigration of high-skilled citizen (brain drain) and the
like (See Nowak, 2001; Gupta, Davoodi & Terme, 2002; Aidt, 2009; Dimant, Krieger &
Meierrieks, 2013. For a general discussion see Jain, 2001 and Dimant, 2014).
Unsurprisingly, corruption also occurs in various forms and in pretty much any area
of sports. Here, embezzlement, match fixing, transfer of players or any kind of dilution
of results are corresponding examples (see Maennig, 2008). Especially with professional
sports attracting not only a lot of interest (estimations range from 800 million to 1.2
billion active sportspersons worldwide but also huge amounts of money might create a
tremendous societal and economic burden. The general figures relating to the stakes
in sports are overly impressive. For example, Bures (2008) argues that an estimated
EUR 2.5 billion were spent on advertising in connection with the 2006 FIFA World cup.
The sports industry at large generates on average between 2.5 and 3.5 of the GDP of
countries. Involvement of money always gives rise to the attempts of biasing the expected
outcome to ones own advantage, likely by using performance-enhancing substances. An
athletes incentives are shaped not only by the (expected) inflow of prize money but also
by the ascending prestige that is intertwined with ones pursue of self-fulfillment. Such
incentives give rise to crossing legal boundaries in order to create a cutting edge.
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As corruption in its various forms soaks through the entire sports system, it distorts
honesty, fair play and trust for the game. The increasing amount of money inherent in
this system makes this industry vulnerable to corruption (Schenk, 2009). It is almost
impossible to reveal whether a particular player takes a backseat on purpose and thus
complies with a stipulated and undisclosed agreement or whether he is just having a bad
day. Outcomes in sports heavily depend on the effort that the sportsman is investing
and which are likely to be under-mined once extra money comes into play. Sadly, these
things can found in any imaginable area of sports (Bures, 2008).
In professional sports, doping is a ubiquitous problem. Recent cases of doping in ath-
letic sports, e.g. the exposure of Asafa Powell, Tyson Gay, Veronica Campbell-Brown
and Sherone Simpson, or the revelation of past and current doping cases in cycling trig-
ger public perception that sports is vastly interpenetrated with performance-enhancing
drugs. Scholars from the Humboldt University found that doping has been a systemic is-
sue in West Germany since the 1970s. Government funds were used to subsidize research
on performance-enhancing studies. In official terms at least, the studies aimed at testing
whether or not certain drugs were performance enhancing. However, when promising
effects were discovered, these products seemingly found their way into the sports circles
quite quickly. Further investigations indicate that Germany experienced a systemic and
systematic problem with doping. In a self-determining way, sport physicians took con-
trol over the use of doping of any kind, sometimes even (at least it is claimed officially)
without the athletes knowledge (see Spiegel Online, 2013; Ahrens, 2013). By and large,
the general practices in East Germany are no exception. In 1991, coaches conceded that
steroids propelled the success of East Germans women swimming teams over a period
of two decades during the so-called Golden Period between the late 1960s and the late
1980s. The East Germanys women swimming teams excelled in nearly every contest
during this period, culminating in crushing the competition by winning 10 out of 14
gold medals and setting eight world records at the first world swimming championship
in 1973 (Janofsky, 1991). Another striking example is former sprint superstar Ben John-
son, who was responsible for what was later called the “dirtiest race in history” when
he humiliated his opponents in the 100 meter sprint final of the 1988 Olympic Games.
Recently, he claimed that “as a youngster like me, thats what I was told by my coach,
that everybody on my level was doing it. So for me to be on a level playing field, I would
have to join in, so to speak, so I said, ‘Why not?’” (Pilon, 2013).
So far, research has been fairly silent on the economics of doping, particularly trying to
include insights from behavioral economics that allow to gain the athletes decision making
process. It will be the aim of this paper to disentangle some of the effects decisively
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affecting the individu-als inclination towards doping, with a focus on the behavioral
perspective. Among other things, our main contribution is a state-of-the-art overview of
the sports corruption literature with a particular focus on doping and the integration of
behavioral theories helping to explain the athletes inclination towards using performance
enhancing drugs that go beyond clear-cut rational decision making processes.
In this paper, we shed light on a particular case of corruption: doping. By induc-
ing frictions to the system through the creation of unwarranted disadvantages, doping
imposes negative externalities on third parties by distorting the level playing field of
fair competition and weakens the public trust in the institutions involved. Following
this reasoning, doping shares fundamental features with general corruption, as doping
generates personal gains to the detriment of others (see Maennig, 2002. For a general
discussion of the various definitions of corruption see Dimant, 2014). We make the case
that, although doping has an introversive purpose, its negative impacts go beyond the
individual level and rather impose detrimental outcomes on the aggregate.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly discuss the main aspects
and history of corruption as well as the detrimental effects of doping on the individual
and aggregate level. In Section 3, we discuss the rational and behavioral approaches
explaining the individual decision-making process with respect to dope. In Section 4,
we discuss the characteristics and detriments of corruption in sports and offer possible
countermeasures. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Corruption in Sports An Overview
2.1 History and Magnitude
Given the increasingly high stakes, the manipulation of fair competition has far reaching
adverse effects on sports nowadays. Allowing for betting on sports results and the like,
and thus being embedded into a multibillion-dollar financial environment, small frictions
in performance enhancement can have tremendous pecuniary impacts. Bures (2008)
argues that there is some consent that American sports in the aggregate, football and
tennis in particular, “face the greatest burden because opportunities for fixing to be
lucrative exist across a wide range of competi-tions.”
People lean towards the belief that corruption in sports has only just become a prob-
lem. Cases of general corruption in sports, like that of the former soccer referee Robert
Hoyzer or the former professional basketball referee Tim Donaghy, the Italians soccer
betting scandal or the case of Lance Armstrong are medially hyped and thus bias our
4
perceptions. A wide range of corruption cases in modern sports have been encountered
over the time, which are comprehensively covered in Maennig, 2008. Even academics
found interest in providing prove for corruption in sports (for NCAA Basketball see
Wolfers, 2006, for Sumo Wrestling see Duggan & Levitt, 2002). However, in some cases
excessive media attention leads to perverted outcomes. The cases of the two successful
(doped) cyclists Lance Armstrong and Jan Ullrich (Jan Ullrich represents the German
counterpart to Lance Armstrong. Although not even near the (bygone) status of Lance
Armstrong, Jan Ullrich is listed as the most successful German cyclist according to
www.cyclinghalloffame.com) are exemplary for such a disparity. On the one hand, after
denying doping for many years, Armstrong has finally been caught doping in 2012. Pro-
moting his personal story and his book aggressively on TV and in press yielded him some
odd form of sympathy. Ullrich, on the other hand, who was also convicted of doping in
2012, is a resented castaway (Ahrens, 2014).
The increasing commercialization and the medial appearance gave rise to the mis-
leading belief that corruption in general and doping in particular are problems of modern
times. The first documented case of corruption dates back to the ancient Olympic Games
in 388 BC when a fighter bribed three of his competitors (Maenning, 2005). “There are
also records of an early case of corruption in sporting management and administration.
In 12 B.C. Damonikos of Elis, father of the Olympic wrestler Polyktor, attempted to
bribe Sosandors, in order for him to persuade his son of the same name to concede vic-
tory in the Olympic wrestling competition to Polyktor. In sum however, a mere handful
of cases of corruption in the ancient Olympic Games, held over a period of about a
thousand years, are documented” (Maenning, 2008). Competing in the earliest days of
modern Olympics starting in 1896, athletes resorted to injections of strychnine, tinctures
of cocaine and the use of alcohol to achieve an edge. In the ancient days, athletes also
ate raw bull testicles to boost their performance (Kelland, 2012). While, over time,
the perception changes with respect to what is considered to be unlawfully performance
enhancing, eating testicles is not (yet) banned in professional sports.
With increasing stakes, corruption in sports has become an immanent problem. The
majority of people involved, directly or indirectly, suffer greatly from the consequences.
It is needless to say that there are also ethical costs involved as it is responsible for
creating an environment that is not conducive for aspiring young athletes. Looking at
the above expressed ideas, corruption is inefficient on both the individual and aggregate
level (Maenning, 2005). For the purpose of our approach, corruption in sports will be
defined as any form of competitive distortion caused by any type of action considered
illegal, unfair or unethical based on common international regulations and confinements,
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as for example issued by the IOC in the Olympic charter. Or, put differently, as denoted
by Maennig (2008):
“[Corruption in sports is understood as] behaviour by athletes who refrain from
achieving the levels of performance normally required in the sport in question to win
the competition and instead intentionally permit others to win, or behaviour by sporting
officials who consciously perform their allocated tasks in a manner at variance with the
objectives and moral values of the relevant club, association, competitive sports in gen-
eral and/or society at large, because they receive or expect pecuniary or non-pecuniary
advantage for them-selves.”
It has soaked through the entire spectrum of sports and poses detrimental effects. It
is alarming that we dont have data of sufficient quality to draw sophisticated inferences
about the spread of doping (ab)use in sports. Some have even gone so far to argue that
no reliable estimate of the prevalence of doping in elite sports has been published so
far (Sottas, Robinson, Fischetto, Doll, Alonso & Saugy, 2011). A few exceptions should
be mentioned. Exemplarily, Sottas et al. (2011) use a comprehensive data set of 7,289
blood samples collected during international athletic competitions since the International
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) has incepted a comprehensive blood-testing
program back in 2001. Their results indicate that on average 14% of the tested athletes
used blood doping. The data also suggests a strong heterogeneity of doping among
athletes, ranging between 1% to 48% for sub samples stratified according to nationality,
sex and typo of sport (endurance vs non-endurance).
In addition, Tokish et al. (2004) report that one to three million athletes in the
United States use anabolic steroids with annual black market sales exceeding $100 mil-
lion. The study also indicates that up to 5% of 10th graders in the United States have
experimented with human growth hormones. What is more, in 2013 a group of Ger-
man scholars evaluated in a triathlon-doping-study 2,997 tri-athletes who participated
in various German Ironman races. The results are worrisome: 13% admitted to physi-
cal doping (e.g. Steroids, EPO, Human Growth Hormone), 15% admitted to cognitive
doping (e.g. Antidepressants, Beta Blockers, Modafinil, Methylphenidate), and 10% ad-
mitted to both physical and cognitive doping (Dietz, Ulrich, Dalaker, Striegel, Fanke,
Lieb & Simon, 2013). While their numbers indicate that as many as 1 in 7 athletes used
performance enhancing drugs, these numbers did not include professional athletes but
only recreational ironman tri-athletes. It is conceivable that this is a lower-bound result
given that professional athletes face higher incentives and have the required skill levels
to boost their performance at a margin that makes the difference between mediocrity
and superstar. We will return to this argument shortly at a later point.
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2.2 Detrimental Effects of Doping
In this section we discuss a range of adverse effects associated with the (mis-)use of doping
in competitive sports from both an individual and aggregate perspective. Such a subdi-
vision is necessary since doping imposes different negative externalities at the individual
level (mainly a health perspective) and aggregate level (mainly a cost perspective).
2.3 The Individual Perspective
Unarguably, doping represents a massive problem in sports, which by this definition is
also a form of corruption as it distorts the underlying principles of fair and competitive
contests. Many forms of sport have heavily suffered from doping, consequently leading to
a depletion in interest for this kind of sports on the customers side. According to Preston
and Szymanski (2003), there are four basic reasons for why doping can be harmful to
sports in general and athletes in particular:
I. It damages the health of athletes.
II. It gives doped athletes an unfair advantage.
III. It undermines interest in the sport.
IV. It undermines the reputation of a sport.
With respect to the athletes health damages, the effects are manifold. The U.S.
Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) lists a number of effects associated with performance
enhancing drugs (PEDs) on their website (www.usada.org). Treating these substances
as dangerous drugs, they claim that “PEDs have the ability or potential to drastically
alter the human body and biological functions, including the ability to considerably
improve athletic performance in certain instanc-es.” For their purpose, the USADA
subdivides the PEDs into 11 categories, which are, among others, Anabolic Agents (in-
cluding Testosterone), Stimulants, Narcotics, Cannabinoids (Marijuana), Beta Blockers,
Blood doping and Human Growth Hormone. The negative effects are substantial and
vary for different age groups and genders. The side effects range from liver damage and
impotence to generally higher risks for strokes and committing suicide.
An increased awareness raised by multiple deaths in sports back in the 1960s yielded
a ban of using stimulants and narcotics in competitions in 1967. From then on, the num-
ber of banned substances and practices has been growing steadily and eventually gave
rise to an official characterization of doping and a list of banned substances by World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 2004. However, such awareness might be biased in the
sense that a higher number of doping cases does not necessarily indicate an outbreak in
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the usage of doping, but might rather reflect an increase in the institutions effectiveness
in unveiling the usage of PEDs going hand in hand with the technological advancement.
Given its hazy nature, a supposedly large dark figure of doping cases is extant. Conse-
quently, the side effects associated with the intake of doping are widely unexplored due
to a lack of meaningful long-term studies. This issue is even more pronounced when
accounting for the wide appropriation of black market substances in wrong doses and
with unknown and hazardous constituents (Kohler, Thevis, Schnzer & Pschel, 2008).
2.4 The Aggregate Perspective
Doping not only imposes detrimental effects on the individual level but also at the
aggregate. Athletes generally act as role models and thus bear ample responsibility.
Being ex-posed for using PEDs not only smears the athletes reputation and questions
the legitimacy of their achievements, but also taints the sports clean slate. Once an
athletes reputation is smeared, the loss of trust might translate into the fans distrust in
institutions and weakening their effectiveness and trustworthiness. For example, this can
happen via triggering extensive (and economically inefficient) infrastructural investments
in the attempt to rebuild the peoples trust (Lessig, 2013). As we will elaborate at a later
point, such an intertwined reputation system might lead to a perverted equilibrium in
which clean athletes are unable to signal their fair sportsmanship (meaning their refusal
to dope) and thus might start doping not because of their individual inclination but based
on a pure utility maximizing calculus. Simply put, if everyone believes that the sport is
infected and everyone dopes anyway, even the clean athletes might start taking PEDs
to level the playing field due to their inability to send a credible signal of being clean.
Conse-quently, the whole sport might accelerate into deviant behavior that is conditional
on both other athletes deviant behavior and the (false) public perception. From a cost
perspective, performing doping tests entail enormous annual costs to society. Referring
to official information from the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Maennig (2014)
estimates the costs in 2013 to range between $229 million and $500 million in order
to cover 270,000 doping tests. Given the testing results, every exposed case of violation
against the rules costs about $70,000. For an assumed sensitivity of doping tests of about
40% (Hermann & Henneberg, 2013) combined with a very short window of detectability
implies a) high social costs in attempts to convict athletes who dope and despite these
high costs b) a residual uncertainty remains with respect to detecting offenders. In an
attempt to detect doping at a higher rate, increasing testing frequencies and improved
testing methods are feasible measures. And even if the costs for testing decline as a result
of improved testing methods, some fixed costs remain. Testing will continuously be in
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need of high organizational effort, as the surveil-lance of athletes is very intense. First,
they have to report their whereabouts to be available for testing procedures. Second, as
performance enhancement will not remain at its status quo there is a need for expanded
testing procedure, which is again costly (Hanstad & Loland, 2009).
In addition, the repetitive occurrence of doping has the power to see a sport lose
its credibility. The best-known case is professional cycling. Continually uncovering a
former and/or current professional cyclist achieved their performance due to the misuse of
performance enhancing drugs. During the period of 1940-2013, more than 600 riders were
detected to be cheating (www.cycling4fans.com). In 2007 media attention peaked and
led the German Telekom to terminate the sponsorship of its T-Mobile-Team. Television
audiences declined in most European countries (Dilger, Frick & Tolsdorf, 2007) and
one year later German television stations abandoned their broadcasting of the Tour de
France as a reaction to doping information being published. Both decisions affected
professional cycling directly as revenues decreased. The inability to absorb the following
decline in revenues even led to the cancellation of the Tour of Germany from 2009 until
now. As both sponsors and broadcasters display the demand for sports studies it has
been revealed that spectators hold a zero tolerance policy towards doping (see Solberg,
Hanstad & Thoring, 2010; Engelberg, Moston & Skinner, 2012)). Repeated violations of
the rule can result into a decline of the whole sector, potentially being negative external
effects on those who were not involved with doping in the first place (Overbye, Knudsen
& Pfinster, 2013).
3 Decision to Dope: Explaining Behavior
In what follows, we will shed light on an athletes decision-making process to engage
in doping from various perspectives. For one, the individual approach will serve as a
starting point to explain deviant behavior. The purpose of this approach is to highlight
the athletes decision as the result of (bounded) rational assessments. The aggregate
approach on the other hand highlights that individual decision-making is subject to the
peer groups decisions and reputation mecha-nisms, consequently being correlative with
the surrounding social environment.
3.1 The Individual Perspective
Monetary and non-monetary incentives play a decisive role in an athletes calculus to
even consider the intake of performance enhancing drugs that are both harmful and
risky with respect to future consequences. Sufficiently high incentives might serve as a
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trigger to over-step boundaries. Research confirms the existence of such incentive effects
for e.g. Golf (see Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990). At the
same time, evaluating relative performance makes sporting contests prone to sabotaging
behavior (see Garicano & Palacios-Huerta, 2005; Deutscher, Frick, Grtler & Prinz, 2013)
and potentially doping (Krkel, 2007). It is thus important to analyze the driving factors
of an athletes decision to go down this dangerous path. We do so by providing both
purely rational and behavioral perspectives that are conducive to the understanding of
doping behavior.
3.2 A Rational Approach
If anything, corruption in sports has widely been discussed from a delineative perspective
in the literature of sports economics. While the ultimate practice is well understood, the
underlying motivations and decision-making processes heavily lack a behavioral perspec-
tive. In what follows, we will seminal contributions that help to understand individual
decision making to dope from a rational perspective.
In their seminal work, Becker and Murphy (1988) develop a general theory of rational
addiction that can easily be adapted to explain individual doping decisions. Hereby,
addition might be the result of either a physical or a social dependency (e.g. ones need
to achieve recognition and approval). Approaching this topic from a rational perspective,
they argue that rational addiction implies the presence of an active calculus that would
consistently maximize utility over time. Their theoretical results suggest that even strong
addictions are driven by rational decisions and involve a forward-looking maximization of
stable preferences. These restrictions have been eased in subsequent research involving
quasi-hyperbolic preferences, leading to an addicts time inconsistent decisions. For a
discussion see Gruber & Kszegi, 2001). Hereby, individuals with high discount rates
for future events and thus a high preference for the present are more likely to become
addicted. From an athletes perspective, the expectation of a short-run gain in the form
of winning con-tests and prize-money might facilitate the use of doping. This is propelled
by the circumstance that an athletes time window to seriously participate in competitive
sports is vastly limited, thus making high discounting of future events even more likely.
Using a similar approach, Maennig (2008) explicitly models the individuals decision
to engage in crime in a rational risk-assessment style. He transforms Beckers (1968)
general model of crime exertion into the context of corruption in sports and argues that
athletes are able to carry out proper risk assessments in order to weigh their expected
benefits against the expected costs. This neoclassical approach can also be used to shed
light on the athletes decision whether or not to dope. Maennig constitutes the following
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to hold:
E(Uni ) =(1− pi) ∗ [Ui ∗ (piYi −DCi − POCi) + pj ∗NPBi −NOCi]
+ pi ∗ [Ui ∗ (−Fi −DCi − POCi)− LRi −NOCi]
Here, E(Uni ) denotes the net utility of the corrupt behavior, pi represents the prob-
ability that the perpetrator is convicted, while pj represents the probability of the suc-
cessful corruption. So, the expression in the brackets after (1 − pi) is the net utility
for the perpetrator in case he is not convicted while the expression after pi is the net
utility in case he is convicted. In the first case, the athletes utility is increased by the
pecuniary income he gets (Yi), and by the non-pecuniary utility (NPBi), e.g. reputation
or honors. However, some costs have to be taken into consideration, such as the direct
costs of preparation including the costs of avoiding detection (DCi), by the pecuniary
opportunity costs (POCi), and the non-pecuniary opportunity costs (NOCi). The sec-
ond addend bears the costs of the financial penalty (Fi) which can also include losses
from further competitions or jobs and the loss of reputation (LRi). Put differently, an
individual will strictly prefer to behave in an illegitimate way if the following holds:
E(Uni ) > NPCi
In line with this cost-benefit perspective, it is important (and yet insufficiently dis-
cussed in academic literature) to analyze the impact of rising stakes on the probability
of using PEDs. In the more recent past, one can observe a substantial increase in ab-
solute wage disparity for both team and individual sports. While US Major Leagues
cap salaries by introducing salary floors and roofs, superstars who are able to draw in
endorsement money often exceeding their regular salary (see Dilger & Tolsdorf, 2014).
Endorsement contracts value increases as companies are able to market athletes world-
wide. Asserting an increase of rewards especially towards the top performers lets one
assume the presence of incentive effects to dope. Marginal returns to improvement are
especially high towards the top positions. For an elite athlete being close to or at the
top of his antagonists or an athlete being close to making the cut for becoming a profes-
sional, the jump in general income and price money development incentives to engage in
illegal performance enhancement are even higher compared to an athlete at the bottom
of the field or an amateur. Prize money development to be observed throughout the last
two decades increased marginal returns to improved performance (and hence doping)
especially for top athletes competing for the highest rewards. As empirical evidence is
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rare, at best survey results and anecdotal evidence indicate the percentage of dopers to
increase with the level of competition they compete at (Pitsch & Emrich, 2012).
Although evidence is still lacking, under these circumstances it is reasonable to assume
that such monetary incentives will have a strong impact on injured athletes to dope in
order to abridge ones injury lay-off. Existing data suggest that, on average, professional
NBA players who suffer from severe injuries lose 30 percent of their value (which is
determined by the athletes performance on the field) in the long-term. The magnitude
of this detrimental effect on a players value is positively correlated with the players age
(Silver, 2014). Along these lines, we argue that the incentives strength in manipulating an
athletes decision whether or not to take performance enhancing drugs is a function of his
own age that most likely exhibits a U-shape characteristic. The reasoning goes as follows:
a competitive athlete in his young years has both the physical conditions and sufficient
upward leeway to allow for a skill boost large enough to create an edge that makes the
difference between mediocrity and superstar. Under these circumstances, the expected
monetary and non-monetary benefits might very well outweigh the risks accompanied
by taking PEDs. While this advantage vanishes with the athlete getting older, this
flattening off is substituted and the initial decline is likely to be overcompensated by
what is known as the endgame effect at the end of his active career. Here, existing
punishment mechanisms like being exempted from participating in tournaments have no
credible sanctioning effect on an old athlete who is close to his retirement. In Section
IV, we highlight measures that have the potential to mitigate individual incentives to
dope and also deal with the endgame effect. For these theoretical arguments to be
strengthened, one would need cross-sectional data of a quality that is higher than what
is currently available. However, using an unbalanced panel of 64 world-class sprinters,
Dilger and Tolsdorf (2005) provide at least some evidence for the existence of the endgame
effect. The dataset entails 3,024 different 100m races for the period 1997-2002. The
results suggest that doped athletes are significantly older (about 3 years) than their
clean tested opponents.
Although the rational incentives to engage in doping in the first place has become
clear, it is not set in stone that such behavior will persist over time and create an
undesirable equilibrium in which doping soaks through the entire system. For this, a
game theoretic approach might be helpful. Bchel et al. (forthcoming) provide such a
perspective to corruption in sports in general and doping in particular. Shedding light on
the sport athletes dilemma, this approach allows studying the respective course of action
as a result of conflict of interest between par-ties, known preferences but unknown actual
intentions. So far, existing game theoretic approaches have been highlighting doping
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decisions either from the perspective of the competitors or from the perspective of both
competitors and organizers. However, no effort has been carried out to introduce a third
party, which makes sports a multibillion industry in the first place: the customer. This
being the main achievement of Bchel et al. (forthcoming), some of the implications of
their model should be highlighted.
Simply put, athletes are in a situation of the prisoners dilemma type. Both of them
would be better off not engaging in doping in the first place. But as nobody can trust
the other, both end up taking drugs in order to enhance their chances to win (at least
in the one-shot consideration without allowing for trust and reputation to build up).
In analyzing the strategic interaction between athletes, doping is commonly found to
represent a dominant strategy, even though it might not be in the best interest of the
athletes (see Breivik, 1992; Haugen, 2004). An extension to this approach is the so-
called inspection game, in which the relationship between athletes and organizations in
charge for doping tests is modeled (Berentsen, 2002; Kirstein, 2014). In an inspection
game, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies but rather mixed equilibria, as
both parties long for different outcomes: the athlete, who wants to dope without being
actually detected, and the control organization, who wants to detect only doped athletes
without having to test also the clean athletes.
Extending the existing approaches, Bchel et al. (forthcoming) introduce the customer
as an additional player to the game. The underlying motivation is straight forward as
customers play a decisive role in making sports profitable. Once customers lose interest,
professional sports might experience a downfall, especially in monetary terms (e.g. cy-
cling). In this vein, the possible threat of customers turning away from sports is included
into the athletes decision making sphere. Here, the basic assumption is a trigger strat-
egy on the side of the customers: they provide support for sports until a doping scandal
occurs, which will then lead to the withdrawal of support. Under mild assumptions, the
unique equilibrium is that athletes dope while organizers underin-vest in testing them.
The reasoning is that the customers threat to withdraw their support leads to a situation
where the organizers rather tolerate (uncovered) doping rather than running the risk of
losing support due to discovered cases of doping. Undoubtedly, this result is not in the
best interest of any party involved.
To sum up, the athletes opportunity costs of not being able to earn (prize) money,
his increasing loss of value as he advances in age and being exposed to a prisoners type
of dilemma work into the same direction and serve as an incentive to take performance
enhancing drugs. As evidence suggests, the combination of these incentives is strong
enough to outweigh the disincentives of punishment.
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3.3 A Behavioral Approach
In this section, we will shed light on individual doping decisions that are driven by
behavioral aspects beyond clear-cut rational decision-making. Consequently, some well-
known behavioral approaches that are conducive to understanding doping decisions will
be discussed.
Bounded rationality, which refers to an individuals cognitive limitation due to the
presence of depletive resources unleash peculiar behavioral patterns. “Two features of
the brain provide foundations for behavior and decision-making. One is its limited in-
formation processing capacity. Humans are purposeful but bounded. They are generally
not irrational or random in behavior. [. . . ] The second is modularity different brain com-
ponents have some ability to affect behavior independently of other modules” (Schmid,
2004). The human brain relies on fundamental patterns, simplifying and accelerating
processing, often leading to more intuitive decisions, to which people frequently refer
to as gut feeling. By any means, humans simultaneously and sequentially implement
various techniques: they make mental accounts, organize choices in a lexicographical
style, and enforce selective perception and the like. As a result, choices are pondered
less deliberatively, potentially inducing inadvertent behavior.
As research indicates, self-control is an integral part of continuous decision making
processes, allowing for more deliberate assessments of each situation and facilitating the
individuals capability to resist temptations. Self-control is treated “as the capacity of
one ‘more rational’ self to override the decisions of a more impulsive one (or several)”
(Achtziger, Alo´s-Ferrer & Wagner, 2011). The underlying idea is that resources needed
to exhibit self-control are the same that are used for controlling and restraining thoughts
and impulses, persisting cognitive tasks and the like. As is evidently true, these resources
are limited, being used for one task only leaves a reduced (if at all) amount of self-control
for subsequent tasks. Using up cognitive resources necessary for self-control induces a
state of ego depletion. Consequently, in a state of ego depletion, self-control is less pro-
nounced, leading to more automatic and thus less deliberate and less rational decisions.
Along these lines, it is reasonable to assume that being exposed to constant physical
and psychical pressure, certain physiological conditions resulting from, in particular,
ego depletion, lower the athletes self-control and consequently the intrinsic threshold to
withstand doping. Consequently, athletes who are ex-posed to extensive physical and
psychical strain are more prone to the abuse of performance enhancing drugs.
From a crime perspective, a lack of self-control is perceived to be the driving fac-
tor behind deviant behavior (see Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1990; Muraven, Pogarsky &
Shmueli, 2006). However, for self-control to be effective, sufficient mental resources are
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needed. At short sight, these resources are finite and once they are depleted, the deci-
sion maker gives in and resorts to using heuristics rather than a deliberative cost-benefit
analysis. Lab experiments indicate that ego depletion sustainably taxes self-control re-
sources, leading to more automatic and less conscious decisions (Achtziger, Alo´s-Ferrer
& Wagner, 2011).
In a sports context this could mean that if the athlete engages in tasks that eat up
cognitive resources needed for self-control, subsequent decisions are taken less apprais-
ingly, possibly leading to more inconsiderate outcomes, e.g. in the form of heuristics.
One can easily imagine that professional athletes who are consistently under physical and
psychological pressure of various kinds (frequent and intense workout, strict nutritional
protocols, restraints and con-strictions of various kinds), quite frequently deplete their
resources, which might influence their intrinsic inclination towards taking performance-
enhancing substances. Experimental evidence points to the idea that impairing cognitive
resources leading to ego depletion has a substantial and a prolonging effect on changes
in behavior and shows an intensifying character as more decisions are made (ld., see also
Vohs, Baumeister, Schmeichel, Twenge, Nelson & Tice, 2008). The decision to dope
might thus be driven by the circumstances of resource depletion rather than by a critical
individual assessment of costs and risks on the one side and benefits on the other side.
In such a mental state, an individual resorts to the use of heuristics. One particular
heuristic approach that is involved in the individual decision-making process is “win-stay,
lose-shift” and is closely connected to habits and standard operating procedures. This
concept is particularly helpful to explain why athletes might stick to their previous choice
to dope. Such a strategy explains the evolution of certain behavioral patterns and can,
in particular, be easily applied to any type of repeated decision problems. In more detail,
once a decision in favor of doping was made, as long as the outcome of the last round was
a success, the player will stick to his previous decision. For our purposes, the outcome
of the last round may be represented by the outcome of last blood test or contest, the
player is the athlete and the decision sphere is denoted by the athletes decision whether
or not to dope in a previous contest. This behavior is evolution-ary stable and might
induce a state of consistent drug abuse as long as athletes are not caught.
Consequently, one could agree with the reasoning that in a cognitive state of ego-
depletion athletes resort to doping more often and with less containment (interestingly,
this aspect has been fairly unnoticeably been touched upon in the seminal work of Becker
and Murphy (1988). They state that “the level of [. . . ] temporary stressful events that
stimulate the demand for addictive goods [. . . ] also affect the likelihood of becoming
addicted.” This in fact is more restrictive than our line of argument, since we argue
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professional athletes have to deal with stressful events not only from time to time but on
a constant basis, thus substantiating our claim even more.) It might be disappointing
but hardly surprising that professional athletes merely focus on their competitive goals
rather than frequently engaging in appraising deliberations. In some cases, doping and
other kinds of corruption in sports might serve the purpose. While most likely the
detrimental effects are underestimated, athletes can live up to their own and external
expectations, before eventually being convicted to misbehave.
3.4 The Aggregate Perspective
3.4.1 Spill-Over Effects and Social Contagion
In this part, focus lies on the role of conditionality in the individuals decision-making
process with respect to using PEDs. This approach represents a combination of imitating
and following other peoples behavior on the basis of complying with possible existing
norms. As will be argued, this approach suggests that an individuals decision to engage
in doping might be the result of spill-over effects resulting from the peers doping decision
that are observed by the individual.
Research indicates that crime has severe contagion effects. Along these lines, indi-
viduals are more inclined towards deviant behavior if people around them behave in an
unethical way (Glaeser, Saverdote & Scheinkman, 1996). Within the context of sports,
one might think of a cycling team, where the initial usage of doping might inflame a
straw fire. Theory suggests that individuals are likely to engage in herding behavior by
following the (bad) example of the peers. Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests
the existence of contagious behavior in diverse contexts such as smoking at school, drug
and alcohol use, co-offending behavior and general acts of crime (see Baumann & En-
net, 1996; Vitaro, Tremblay, Kerr, Pagani & Bukowski, 1997; Reiss, 1988; Alexander,
Piazza, Mekos & Valente, 2001; Andrews, Tildesley, Hopy & Li, 2002). Moreover, Falk
and Fischbacher (2002) find support for reciprocal preferences as a source of social in-
teraction, Gino et al. (2009) argue that contagion in unethical behavior is driven by
group-differentiation, Zafar (2011) finds that both learning about the descriptive norm
and image-related concerns play a role in the choices of the subjects, and Dimant (2014a)
provides evidence that the magnitude of contagion is subject to the individuals social
proximity to the peers and that the adaptation of bad behavior is fundamentally differ-
ent from the adaptation of good behavior (for a comprehensive literature overview see
Dimant, 2014b). In the context of sports, Ichniowski and Preston (2014) find evidence
for the existence of peer effects and spillovers of skill among soccer players. Although
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research is still silent on this, it is reasonable to assume that such findings are not only
context dependent but also translate to the sports context. Especially in team sport,
spillover effects are likely to appear within members of the same team. Anecdotal evi-
dence from Jamaica indicates that extensive institutional corruption of the anti-doping
regime is also conducive to the spillover of systematic doping across different forms of
sport (Bond, 2013).
In addition, one might account for the fact that money represents a positional good,
indicating that the value derived from it also depends on the peers behavior. Conse-
quently, both the striving for a higher social status and recognition by the peers scale
up the subjective importance of money, eventually representing a decisive factor for an
athlete to overstep bounds. In this context, Kirchgssner (2014) argues that “the fear of
losing ones current standard of living (consumption) might be one reason for engaging
in risky activities like corruption”, which he also refers to as the catching up with the
Joneses motive. Evidently, peer groups exhibit a traceable impact on individual behav-
ior. In the context of sports, when being exposed ones peers deviant behavior such as
doping, even an intrinsically motivated honest person might be inclined to conform to
the (perceived) social norms in order to not be the odd one out. In retrospective, this
seems to be a true observation for cycling. More often, not only single professionals
were convicted of doping but it was also found to be institutionalized among the teams,
exerting extensive pressure (both with respect to performance and social belonging) on
those who dont comply.
3.4.2 Threat of Reputation Loss
Reputation is an essential and immanent feature of everyday life. In a social context,
reputation determines the own trustworthiness and once undermined it is hard to rehabil-
itate into society. As discussed by Maennig (2006), already in ancient history, reputation
played a decisive role in sports. “In the ancient Olympics, the corrupt athletes were heav-
ily punished by financial means. Each of them had to pay for the construction of zanes
(column of shame), which was then placed directly at the entrance of the Olympic Sta-
dium. These columns cost a fortune because they were made of the best materials and
manufactured by the best artisans.” Not only the monetary loss but also the negative
impact of the loss of face represented a deterrent factor.
Along these lines, the impact of possible reputation loss might deter individuals to
dope in the first place. However, an individuals reputation depends not only on ones
own behavior but also on the behavior of peers and predated group comportment. For
this, we apply the results derived by the seminal work of Tirole (1996) on the role of
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reputation on doping decisions. He was among the first to not only incorporate the
possibility of reputation recovery once lost due to misbehavior, but also to highlight the
interdependencies between individual and collective reputation.
In this context, the impact of joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations
on the persistence of corruption is studied. It is assumed that individual incentives are
affected by the individuals past behavior (which is commonly observed by outsiders in a
noisy matter) and the groups past behavior, thus introducing reputation effects. Hereby,
an intergenerational dependency of past members behavior and possible reputation loss
on current members decision vectors is modelled. In the context of sports, such an
approach allows light to be shed on how past group members decision of e.g. a cycling
team impact a current team members decision with respect to whether or not to dope.
One of the main results is that under particular condi-tions, current members of a group
are locked-in into deviant behavior as a result of past group members deviant behavior.
Here, the groups reputation has been damaged in the past and engaging in deviant
behavior in the present becomes the best response. The mechanism works as follows:
Figure 1: Interdependency of information and behavior on reputation (own illustration)
New group members may suffer from past deviant behavior of the elders in con-
sequence of damaged reputation which implies that such interdependency might lead
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to both short-and long-run steady state corruption-traps. While the loss of reputation
functions as a threat to the individual and thus should represent a deterrent factor, once
reputation is smeared by the other group members, a short-run and long-run corruption
steady-state might be reached in which it is not worthwhile to remain faithful and ab-
stain from using PEDs. In consequence, using this approach one can easily comprehend
that not only the individuals inclination towards misbehavior is of importance but also
the composition of the close environment.
4 Countermeasures to Fight Doping
The comprehensive mitigation of the illegal taking of doping requires a multifaceted
approach. Various leverage points are conceivable. From a classical cost-benefit perspec-
tive, raising the (expected) costs for doping might do the trick, which in return can be
expected to (c.p.) reduce the incentives for such deviant behavior in the first place. This
can be implemented via both pecuniary penalty in form of fees and an extended ban
from the federation or any form of competition events of corrupt athletes. The possible
loss of reputation represents a strong cost-driving factor. If the media sticks together
and carries out extensive media coverage, the concomitant costs would rise significantly.
One feasible approach is to extend the (randomized) testing of professional athletes for
PEDs. In particular, given that athletes depending on their skill level and age exhibit
different incentives to dope, such results could give rise to more selective additional
testing (for example, athletes who just rehabilitated from a severe injury). Preston and
Szymanski (2003) argue that although randomized testing would increase the chance of
exposing doped athletes and thus increase the (expected) costs as well, most professional
US sports managed to reach agreements through the player unions putting a ban on
randomized testing. Partly, the concomitant costs can be internalized via reinforcing
incentives for self-reporting, blowing the whistle and asymmetric punishment (see Basu,
Basu & Cordella, 2014; Maennig, 2014). While increasing the fines to reach an incentive-
compatible level to deter athletes from using PEDs might seem to represent a feasible
approach in general, excessive fines like the ones imposed on Petar Korda might not bring
about the desired outcome (in fact, Petar Korda was not only banned from competition
but also had to repay the prize money he won. He never actually paid the money back.
See Maennig, 2014).
Another potential approach would aim at reducing expected benefits. As argued
before, extensive doping is extremely lucrative in professional sports due to high stakes,
which in turn facilitate rent-seeking behavior on the side of the athletes. Reducing the
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rents involved in sports could be achieved by, for example, lowering the prize money for
the athletes or reducing the athletes base income. On the one hand, reducing benefits
of sporting events and the like would clearly reduce the incentive to engage in deviant
behavior as it would (c.p.) deteriorate the relationship between expected costs and
expected benefits. On the other hand, reducing benefits could potentially harm the whole
industry as the peoples excitement and involvement in sports might peak off significantly.
Along these lines, adjusting the disparity in the athletes incomes represents another
regulating screw. The design of professional sporting contests and the resulting income
inequality potentially incentivize doping, especially amongst top athletes. Following
theoretical considerations by Lazear and Rosen (1981), sporting contests are decided
upon the relative performance by the athletes. Hence marginal differences in performance
can determine the outcome of the contest. Rosen (1981) states that a small number of
people earn enormous amounts of money in the field they engage in. Thus, marginal
differences in talent result in large income a differences, which lead to the result that
marginal differences in sporting performance cause not so marginal differences in revenues
generated by the contestants.
Further attempts to fight the doping issue involve harsher measures such as tem-
porarily excluding the tainted sports disciplines from the Olympic program, banning the
television broadcast or shifting the cost burden to official institutions of the respective
sport (Maennig, 2014). In accordance with the deferred compensation model developed
by Lazear (1979), Maennig (2002) proposes a mechanism according to which professional
athletes would deposit part of their prize money into a fund. This money will be safely
stored and paid out after they retire if, in retrospective, they remained clean over the
course of their sports career. This in fact might counterbalance the athletes incentive to
dope induced by the earlier discussed endgame effect. However, it remains questionable
whether athletes are willing to take the real loss in income brought about by deferring
payments to the future. Since athletes (just as regular people as well) discount future in-
come and thus prefer consumption now over consumption later, such an approach might
distort incentives. In the short term, this is especially true for athletes who are active
at the time of the introduction of such measures due to a shift in their reference point.
Having been used to a system where they were in charge of their whole prize money,
giving up this prestige might provoke broad rejection. However, in the medium and long
term and especially for young (amateur) athletes, such a one-time cut can be expected
to cause a less pronounced rejection.
Unarguably, doping in sport imposes various pronounced negative effects on society
and economy, impacting individuals, teams and entire sports equally and thus is worth
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the fight. Maennig (2006) argues that one case of corruption alone can cause significant
social marginal damage, since in general it may result not only in a considerable loss of
image for the perpetrator, but also for the sporting discipline as a whole and even for
sport in general, and may not necessarily stop at the borders of the individual country
involved. From an institutional perspective, one can only hope that the transpired doping
cases trigger the formation of more sophisticated official bodies taking the issue of doping
more seriously than until now. The inception of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
in 1999, the publication of the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 and the agreement of the
UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport in 2005 represent landmarks (Boulihan,
2014).
However, the effectiveness of countermeasures to fight corruption in sports in gen-
eral and rambling doping in particular is mediated by the corruption inherent to the
institutions itself. Such corruption potentially dissuades institutions from their initial
purpose and consequently sands the wheels of the implemented efforts to successfully
and sustainably fight corruption. One striking example is the International Federation
of Association Football (FIFA). For decades, FIFA has been on and off involved in cor-
ruption scandals with respect to vote buying, awarding of contracts and the World Cup
bids. Representing the main governing body of international soccer, one would expect
such an institution to take the clearing up of corruption more seriously than it has been
the case so far. In fact, FIFAs Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee
(FEC) seems to be negligent of shedding light on existing deficiencies and instead defers
the publication of the final report dealing with the investigation of the latest corrup-
tion issues related to the allegedly corrupt World Cup bids of 2018 (Russia) and 2022
(Qatar) (see The Telegraph, 2014). Under such circumstances institutions fail to fulfill
their duties and in turn contribute to breeding systemic corruption. With high stakes on
the line, such an economy of influence is serving the interests of a few at the expense of
the many. Unsurprisingly, the fight against corruption of any kind in sports cannot be
successful as long as the underlying institutions suffer from the same disease. More steps
have to be undertaken to ensure clean sports and fair competition, such as creating truly
independent governing institutions that are prevented from pursuing their own interests
or those of a minority of stakeholders.
5 Final Remarks
As has been exhaustively argued throughout this paper, corruption in sports is highly
relevant and persistently existing in pretty much any area of professional sports. Fixing
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matches, bribing officials, using performance-enhancing substances and the like are sub-
stantially impeding sports. Having shed light on general characteristics of corruption in
sports, the focus of this paper was to bring together economic theories from both the
rational and behavioral sphere to analyze the athletes inclination towards doping. The
implications suggest that both approaches are useful in explaining doping decisions and
that athletes are driven by a complex bundles of cost-benefit calculations, incentives,
reputation concerns, spill-over effects and social contagion and the like.
Existing research is still relatively quiet on many issues with respect to the sports
problem with corruption in general and doping in particular. Consequently, the institu-
tions in charge have trouble to implement the right mix of rules and leeway to allow for a
clean and competitive sport. One fundamental problem is the lack of good data. Given
the excessively high monetary and non-monetary stakes involved in (professional) sports,
such a deficiency is worrisome. Official bodies and institutions should procure that the
seizure of a clean sport is taken as seriously and as professionally as the sport disciplines
themselves. After all, both on the individual and aggregate level, no one benefits from
infested disciplines in the long run.
22
References
Achtziger, A., Alo´s-Ferrer, C., & Wagner, A. (2011). Social Preferences and Self-Control.
Working Paper: 5.
Ahrens, P. (2014). Lance Armstrong im US-Fernsehen: Perfekt vermarkteter Betrug.
Spiegel Online, August 20, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/sport/sonst/lance-
armstrong-doping-luegen-beichte-a-987105.html.
Ahrens, P. (2013). Doping bei Spitzensportlern: Die Spritze hat mich fertiggemacht.
Spiegel Online, August 5, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/sport/sonst/doping-
in-westdeutschland-kolbe-dressel-und-die-anderen-a-914818.html.
Aidt, T. (2009). Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development. Oxford Review
of Economic Policy, 25, 271-91
Alexander, C., Piazza, M., Mekos, D., & Valente, T. (2001). Peers, Schools, and Ado-
lescent Cigarette Smoking. Journal of Adolescent Health, 29, 22-3.
Andrews, J., Tildesley, E., Hops, H., & Li, F. (2002). The Influence of Peers on Young
Adult Substance Use. Health Psychology, 21, 349-57.
Basu, K., Basu, K., & Cordella, T. (2014). Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument
of Corruption Control. The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 6933.
Baumann, K. & Ennett, S. (1996). On the Importance of Peer Influence for Adolescent
Drug Use: Commonly Neglected Considerations. Addiction, 91, 185-98.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political
Economy, 76, 169-217.
Becker, G., & Murphy, K. (1988). A Theory of Rational Addiction. Journal of Political
Economy, 96, 675-700.
Berentsen, A. (2002). The Economics of doping. European Journal of Political Economy,
18, 109-27.
23
Bond, D. (2013). Jamaica Doping Scandals Tip Of Iceberg, Says Senior Drug Tester.
BBC, November 11, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/athletics/24900565.
Breivik, G. (1992). Doping Games: A Game Theoretical Exploration of Doping. Inter-
national Review for the Sociology of Sport, 27, 235-53.
Bchel, B., Emrich, E., & Pohlkamp, S. (2014). Nobodys Innocent: The Role of Cus-
tomers in the Doping Dilemma. Journal of Sports Economics, forthcoming.
Bures, R. (2008). Why Sport is not Immune to Corruption. Transparency International:
Work-ing Paper.
www.cyclinghalloffame.com
Deutscher, C., Frick, B., Grtler, O., & Prinz, J. (2013). Sabotage in Tournaments with
Heter-ogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch. The Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 1138-57.
Dietz, P., Ulrich, R., Dalaker, R., Striegel, H., Franke, A., Lieb, K., & Simon, P. (2013).
Associations between Physical and Cognitive Doping A Cross-Sectional Study in
2,997 Triathletes. PLoS ONE 8:11.
Dilger, A., Frick, B., & Tolsdorf, F. (2007). Are Athletes Doped? Some Theoretical
Argu-ments and Empirical Evidence. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25, 604-15.
Dilger, A., & Tolsdorf, F. (2005). Karriereverlufe und Doping von 100 m-Lufern. Mod-
ellgesttzte Personalentscheidungen, 8, 103-17.
Dimant, E. (2014a). The Nature of Corruption An Interdisciplinary Perspective, Center
for International Economics: Working Paper Series No. 2014-06.
Dimant, E. (2014b). Contagion Effects in Crime and the Role of Social Proximity An
Experimental Approach. Mimeo.
Dimant, E., Krieger, T., & D. Meierrieks (2013). The Effect of Corruption on Migration,
1985-2000, Applied Economics Letters, 20, 1270-74.
24
Duggan, M., & Levitt, S, (2002). Winning Isnt Everything: Corruption in Sumo
Wrestling. The American Economic Review, 92, 1594-1605.
Ehrenberg, R., & Bognanno, M. (1990). Do Tournaments have Incentive Effects?. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 98, 1307-24.
Ehrenberg, R., & Bognanno, M. (1990). The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited:
Evidence from the European PGA Tour. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43,
74-88.
Engelberg, T., Moston, S., & Skinner, J. (2012). Public Perception of Sport Anti-Doping
Policy in Australia. Drugs: Education, Prevention & Policy, 19, 84-7.
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2002). Crime in the lab-detecting social interaction. Euro-
pean Economic Review, 46, 859-69.
Forbes (2014). The Worlds Highest-Paid Athletes. Forbes, September 10, 2014, http:
//www.forbes.com/athletes/list.
Garicano, L., & Palacios-Huerta, I. (2005). Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beau-
tiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful. London School of Economics: Discussion Paper.
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Be-
havior. Psychological Science, 20, 393-98.
Glaeser, E., Sacerdote, B., & Scheinkman, J. (1996). Crime and Social Interactions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 11, 507-48.
Gruber, J., & Kszegi, B. (2001). Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 116, 1261-1303.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income in-
equality and poverty?. Economics of Governance, 3, 23-45.
Hanstad, D., & Loland, S. (2009). Elite Athletes Duty to Provide Information on their
25
Whereabouts: Justifiable Anti-Doping Work or an Indefensible Surveillance Regime?.
Euro-pean Journal of Sport Science 9:1.
Haugen, K. (2004). The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game. Journal of Sports Eco-
nomics, 5, 67-86.
Hermann, A., & Henneberg, M. (2013). Anti-Doping Systems in Sports are Doomed to
Fail: A Probability and Cost Analysis. University of Adelaide.
Hirschi, T., & Gottfredson, M. (1990). A General Theory of Crime.Stanford University
Press.
Houlihan, B. (2009). Achieving compliance in international anti-doping policy: An anal-
ysis of the 2009 World Anti-Doping Code. Sport Management Review, 17, 265-76.
Ichniowski, C., & Preston, A. (2014). Do Star Performers Produce More Stars? Peer
Effects and Learning in Elite Teams. NBER Working Paper No. 20478.
Innes, R. (1999). Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement. Journal
of Public Economics, 72, 379-93.
Jain, A. (2001). Corruption: a review. Journal of economic surveys, 15(1), 71-121.
Janofsky, M. (1991). Olympics; Coaches Concede That Steroids Fueled East Germanys
Success in Swimming. The New York Times, December 3. http://www.nytimes.
com/1991/12/03/sports/olympics-coaches-concede-that-steroids-fueled-east-
germany-s-success-in-swimming.html.
Kelland, K. (2012). Ancient Dopers got their Kicks from Raw Testicles. Reuters,
August 1, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-oly-doping-
history-day-idUSBRE8700YC20120801.
Kirchgssner, G. (2014). On Self-Interest and Greed. Center for Research Economics,
Man-agement and the Arts: Working Paper No. 2014-12, 11.
Kirstein, R. (2014). Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement. Journal
26
of Sports Economics, 15, 385-409.
Kohler, M., Thevis, M., & Schnzer, W. and Pschel, K. (2008). Gesundheitsschden und
Todesflle durch Doping. Rechtsmedizin, 18, 177-82.
Krkel, M. (2007). Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations. IZA Discussion Pa-
pers No. 2059.
Lazear, E. (1979). Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?. Journal of Political Economy,
87, 1261-84.
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.
The Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-64.
Lessig, L. (2013). Institutional Corruption Defined. Journal of Law, Medicine and
Ethics, 41, 3.
Maennig, W. (2014). Inefficiency of the Anti-Doping System: Cost Reduction Proposals.
Substance Use & Misuse, 49, 1201-05.
Maennig, W. (2008). Corruption in International Sports and How it May be Combatted.
International Association of Sports Economists: Working Paper Series No. 08-13.
Maennig, W. (2006). Corruption. In: Andreff, W. and Szymanski, S. (eds) Handbook
on the Economics of Sport (Edward Elgar, 2006).
Maennig, W. (2005). Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management: Forms,
Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures. European Sport Management Quarterly,
5, 187-225.
Maennig, W. (2002). On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International
Sports. Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 61-89.
Muraven, M., Pogarsky, G., & Shmueli, D. (2006). Self-control Depletion and the Gen-
eral Theory of Crime. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 22, 263-77.
27
Nowak, R. (1996). Corruption and transition economies. Science, 48, 321-35
Overbye, M., Knudsen, M., & Pfister, G. (2013). To Dope or not to Dope: Elite Ath-
letes Perceptions of Doping Deterrents and Incentives. Performance Enhancement
& Health, 2, 119-34.
Pilon, M. (2013). Sprinter in 1988 Olympic Scandal Deplores Doping. The New York
Times, September 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/sports/ben-johnson-
sprinter-in-1988-scandal-denounces-doping.html?_r=2&.
Pitsch, W., & Emrich, W. (2012). The Frequency of Doping in Elite Sport: Results of a
Replication Study. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 47: 559-80.
Preston, I., & Szymanski, S. (2003). Cheating in Contests. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 19:4: 612-24.
Reiss, A. (1988). Co-Offending and Criminal Careers. Crime and Justice 10: 117-70.
Rosen, S. (1981). The Economics of Superstars. The American Economic Review: 845-
58.
Schenk, S. (2009). Corruption and Sport: Building Integrity and Preventing Abuses.
Transpar-ency International: Working Paper.
Schmid, A. (2004). Conflict and Cooperation Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Blackwell Publishing, 28.
Silver, N. (2014). What Happens to Injured NBA Stars Like Paul George?. http://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-happens-to-injured-nba-stars-like-paul-
george/.
Solberg, H., Hanstad, D., & Thoring, T. (2010). Doping in Elite Sport Do the Fans
Care? Public Opinion on the Consequences of Doping Scandals. International Jour-
nal of Sports Marketing & Sponsorship 11:3: 185-99.
Sottas, P.-E., Robinson, N., Fischetto, G., Doll, G, Alonso, J., & Saugy, M. (2011).
28
Preva-lence of Blood Doping in Samples Collected from Elite Track and Field Ath-
letes. Clinical Chemistry 57:5: 762-69.
Spiegel Online (2013). Humboldt-Universitt: Studie enthllt systematisches Doping in der
BRD. http://www.spiegel.de/sport/sonst/studie-der-humboldt-universitaet-
systematisches-doping-in-der-brd-a-914597.html
The Telegraph (2014). Pressure grows on FIFA to publicise its report into possible World
Cup bid corruption. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/
11118834/Pressure-grows-on-Fifa-to-publicise-its-report-into-possible-
World-Cup-bid-corruption.html.
Tirole, J. (1996) A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persis-
tence of Corruption and to Firm Quality). The Review of Economic Studies, 63, 1-22.
Tokish, J., Kocher, M., & Hawkins, R. (2004). Ergogenic Aids: A Review of Basic
Science. Performance Side Effects, and Status in Sports. The American Journal of
Sports Medicine 32:6:1543-53.
Vitaro, F., Tremblay, R., Kerr, M., Pagani, L., & Bukowski, W. (1997). Disruptiveness,
Friends Characteristics, and Delinquency in Early Adolescence: A Test of Two Com-
peting Models of Development. Child Development 68:4: 676-89.
Vohs, K., Baumeister, R., Schmeichel, B., Twenge, J., Nelson, N., & Tice, D. (2008).
Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of
Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 94:5: 883-98.
Wolfers, J. (2006). Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball. The American
Economic Review 96:2: 270-83.
Zafar, B. (2011). An Experimental Investigation of Why Individuals Conform. European
Economic Review 55: 774-98.
29
